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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION,
Plaintif!-Appellant,
vs.
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN,
Defendant-Respondent,
ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN,
Plaintif/-Respondent,
vs.
\'UL CAN STEEL CORPORATION
and J. DEAN GERSTNER,
Defendants-Appellants,

Case No.

115'54

ABRAHAM MARKOSIAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
VULCAN STEEL CORPORATION
and J. DEAN GERSTNER,
Defendants-Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This action is a consolidation of three lawsuits involving the rights and dbligations of Vulcan Steel Corporation
and its two shareholders J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham
Markosian.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On February 24, 1969, the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered
an order granting respondent Markosian's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment thereby requiring Vulcan Steel
Corporation to redeem Abraham Markosian's stock at a
price to be determined in accordance with a certain agreement executed on April 12, 1965.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal of the lower court's Order
of Partial Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the spring of 1965, J. Dean Gerstner and Abraham
Markosian commenced negotiations to organize a steel fabricating business. At that time Gerstner was a majority
shareholder in several family corporations engaged in the
steel business and had a steel plant, machinery, equipment
and steel inventories located in Salt Lake City, Utah. On
April 12, 1965, Markosian and Gerstner executed an Agree·
ment whereby the parties would commence the steel fabri·
eating business at the Gerstner plant site under the name
of Vulcan Steel Corporation. Gerstner received 51 % of
the stock of the Corporation in exchange for steel inven·
tories located at the plant site (R. 6). Markosian sub·
scribed to 49% of the stock to be paid as follows (R. 7):
1.

Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars in cash.
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2. Ten Thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars on or before
May 1, 1965.
Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars on or before April 1, 1966.
3.

Markosian paid the initial $10,000.00 on .the date required by the Agreement and $10,000.00 on May 5, 1965,
but failed and refused to pay the final $20,000.00 subscribed for under the Agreement on the date of April 1,
1966, as therein provided (R. 118).
The Agreement provided that Gerstner would be president and treasurer of the Corporation and that Markosian
would be vice-president, general manager and secretary
(R. 7). The Agreement also required the Corporation to
employ Markosian for five years at $800.00 per month plus
5/o of the net profits before taxes (R. 7) .. In return, Markosian was required to devote his entire time and efforts
to the affairs of the Corporation for the term of five years
(R. 8).
The Agreement contained restrictions on the sale of
the stock by the parties to the extent that the Corporation
had first option to buy in the event a party desired to dispose of his stock (R. 9). However, at the request of Markosian, subparagraph 3 (c) was inserted into the Agreement to provide for mandatory re-purchase of stock by the
Corporation in the event Markosian's employment was terminated by the Corporation (Markosian's Deposition, p.
63). Subparagraph 3 (c) reads as follows (R. 10):
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"(c)

Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock

Offer.
At the termination of employment by Corporation
of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason, it shall be
mandatory for Corporation to purchase all of the
stock of Markosian, Gerstner, or any stockholder or
transferee giving written notice as herein provided
of his or her intention to dispose of his or her stock

"
Whether the Corporation purchased stock under its
first option or under the mandatory provisions of subparagraph 3 ( c), the purchase price was to be determined under
the same formula. The formula, as contained in subparagraph 3 (c), required an increase of depreciated values to
fair market value and the addition of good will at the rate
of 2¥2 times the average profits for the previous five years
(R. 10).

On January 5, 1968, Markosian decided to terminate
his employment with Vuloan Steel Corporation and made
preparations to organize a new steel company known as
Mark Steel in competition with appellant Corporation (R.
118). Thereafter, Markosian, knowing he was quitting bus·
iness with Vulcan Steel Corpioration, and resigning his po·
sition as vice-president, general manager, secretary and
director, secretly and without notice to the appellant Cor·
poration deposited fo Vulcan Steel Corporation's account
the sum of $20,000.00 as payment for purchase of the out·
standing balance of his subscription obligation (R. 118).
Thereafter, on January 23, 1968, Markosian voluntarily
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terminated his employment with Vulcan Steel Corporation
in a letter by his attorney which stated as follows (R. 119) :
"Mr. Markosian suhmits herewith his resignation as
vice-president, general manager, secretary iand as
director of the Corporation to hecome effective as
of the date hereof."
Respondent in said letter demanded re-purchase by the Corporation of the shares of stock owned by him in said Corporation pursuant to subparagraph 3 ( c), Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock Offered, at 'the increased price
therein provided (R. 119).
The Court in its order granting respondent Markosian's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment has ordered
appellant Vulcan Steel Corporation to redeem Markosian's
stock at the present time in accordance with the formula
provided in the mandatory re-purchase clause (R. 136).
Appellant Vulcan Steel Corporation appeals from that
order.
ARGUMENT
THE ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT INTERPRETING THE AGREEMENT
OF APRIL 12, 1965, TO REQUIRE A MANDATORY RE..1PURCHASE OF STOCK IN THE
EVENT OF A VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION
BY RESPONDENT MARKOSIAN IS ERRONEOUS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A.

THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION DISREGARDS PART OF THE PARTICULAR
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LANGUAGE PERTAINING TO TERMINATION BY THE CORPORATION.
B.

THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION IGNORES OTHER SECT I 0 N'S OF THE
:AGREEMENT W H I C H SPECIFICALLY
PROVIDE FOR VOLUNTARY RESIGNATIONS FROM THE CORPORATION AND
FOR THE FREE SALE OR DISPOSITION
OF STOCK TO OUTSIDERS.

C.

THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION PERMITS THE RESPONDENT TO PROFIT
FROM HIS OWN WRONG BY BREACHING
THE TERMS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT.

D.

SUBPARAGRAPH 3 (C) SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED AGAINST RESPONDENT
MARKOSIAN SINCE THIS PROVISION
WAS INITIALLY DRAFTED BY HIS ATTORNEY.

E.

IF THE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS
CONCERNING A MANDATORY REPURCHASE, THEN THE COURT SHOULD RECEIVE P AROL EVIDENCE AS TO THE
INTENT OF THE PARTIES BECAUSE:
1.

THE AGREEMENT WAS NOT INTENDED AS AN INTEGRATED DOCUMENT; RATHER, IT CONTEMPLATED A SEPARATE AND ADDITIONAL
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EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WHICH
WOULD DEFINE THE RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF EMPLOYMENT.
2.

THE DIVERGENT OPINIONS OF THE
PARTIES WOULD AT LEAST INDICATE THAT THE CONTRACT IS UNCERTAIN IN THIS REGARD AND REQUIRES AMPLIFICATION BY PAROL
EVIDENCE.

*
A.

*

*

*

THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION DISREGARDS PART OF THE PARTICULAR
LANGUAGE PERTAINING TO TERMINATION BY THE CORPORATION.

The language in question is as follows (R. 9) :

Mandatory obligation to purchase stock offered. At the termination of employment by Corporation of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason,
it shall be mandatory for Corporation to purchase
all of the stock of Markosian, Gerstner, or any
stockholder or transferee •.. "
" ( c)

The interpretation adopted by the Court disregards or fails
to give effect to the words '~by Corporation". Under such
interpretation, those words might as well :be deleted from
the phrase, so it would read as follows:
"At the terminaltion of employment bY. :&11tel'8$i&Jl
of Markosian or Gerstner for any reason •.."
Since those words were not deleted, but were in fact included, they must be there for a purpose and must be given
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meaning and effect. The intent of the Agreement by so including them was to provide that upon the termination by
the Corporation, there would be a mandatory repurchase.
Thris was the protection desired by Markosian as the minority stockholder, so that if his employment relationship was
terminated by the Corporation for any reason, his investment would not be frozen in the Corporation. He would have
no control over such a contingency. However, he would have
control over a voluntary resignation and therefore the
parties provided for such contingency by permitting a voluntary sale, subject only to the first option rights of the
Corporation under subparagraph 3 (b) of the Agreement.
If the language of the mandatory repurchase clause was
extended to all instances of termination of employment,
whether by the Corporation or voluntarily, the Corporation
would be powerless to resist such termination and would
have to purchase the stock of Markosian regardless of the
fact Markosian was the party breaching the contract.
The mandatory repurchase provision of subparagraph
3 ( c) contemplates action at a particular time when it
talks about "at the termination of employment by the Car·
poration". The only action contemplated is that by the
Corporation. If the respondent intended any different '
meaning, the same could have been clearly indicated.
That the parties contemplated the possibility of termi·
nation by the Corporation is evidenced by language on page
3 of the Agreement, which states: " ... unless Corporation
notifies Markosian in writing within 60 days of the end
of the term, or any extension thereof, of ds intention to
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tei'minate such Agreement
." (emphasis added) (R.
8). This provision which precedes the mandatory repurchase paragraph clearly indicates that the patties had in
mind that under certain circumstances the company would
terminate the Agreement and, therefore, it is logical for the
parties to provide what the duties of the Corporation would
be in such event.
The cases hold that the word "by" contemplates action
and the usual definition is that "by" means "through the
means, act, or instrumentality". U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 45 P. 2d 895,
899, 96 Colo. 571; O'Brien v. East River Bridge Co., 55 N.
Y. S. 206, 208, 36 App. Div. 17.
The words "by the indemnified" have been construed
to mean "the act of the indemnified". American Credit
Inrlemnity Co. v. Cassard, 34 A. 703, 704, 83 Md. 272.
Words "by order of the court" or "by the court" have
consistently been construed to mean by court action or
under the supervision of the court. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co.
V. Samplry, 134 S. E. 2d 71, 74, 108 Ga. App. 617; Howell
V. Van Houten, 296 S. W. 2d 428, 430, 227 Ark. 84.
The words "by such electors" have been construed to
mean that the action must be by the electors and not by
agents. O'Keeffee v. Du_qan, 172 N. Y. S. 558, 559, 185
App. Div. 53.
Applying the foregoing case authority to the instant
case it is clear that action was contemplated by someone
and the only person designated was the Corporation. We
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are, therefore, talking about termination by Corporation
and not termination of employment with Corporation. The
interpretation by the Pretrial Judge is such that the words
"by Corporation" might as well have been deleted from the
Agreement, but since they were not deleted from the Agreement, and if they are to be given some meaning, then the
only possible meaning would be that of providing for the
rights of the parties upon termination by the Corporation
and not upon voluntary resignation by the respondent.

B.

THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION IGNORES OTHER SECT I 0 NS OF THE
AGREEMENT WHICH SPECIFICALLY
PROVIDE FOR VOLUNTARY RESIGNATIONS FROM THE CORPORATION AND
FOR THE FREE SALE OR DISPOSITION
OFSTOCKTOOUTfilDER&

After discussing the rights and duties of the parties
upon termination of employment by Corporation, the
Agreement discusses the rights of the parties in the event
they voluntarily decide to terminate their employment (R.
12). Since the attention of the parties and the draftsmen
were specifically called to the question of what should happen if the parties voluntarily resigned, the Court should
not now read into the contract additional provisions involv·
ing this situation not specifically specified by the parties.
It is a fundamental rule of construction that where the
parties have specifically discussed a subject matter, the
Court should not infer or add provisions involving that subj ect matter not so specifically discussed.
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Likewise, subparagraph 3 (b) is ignored by an interpretation which invokes subparagraph 3 ( c) upon the voluntary resignation of an employee. Subparagraph 3 ( c) is
designed to prote0t employees at the instance of a termination by the Corporation. Subparagraph 3 (b) offers adequate protection to employees in the event they voluntarily
resign. To enlarge the scope of subparagraph 3 (c) is to
limit the scope of subparagraph 3 (b).
The District Judge, in his Memorandum Decision on
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, appears to have
done just that and to have ignored the first option provision of subparagraph 3 (b). The Memorandum Decision on
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment gives the basis for
the ruling which is here being appealed. That memorandum decision lists the restrictions upon the sale of Vulcan
Steel Corporation stock and then reasons that the restrictions reflect the intention of the parties to provide for
mandatory redemption by the Corporation rather than to
permit the stock to be sold or transferred by the parties to
the Agreement (R. 132 & 133). This reasoning is specious
because it fails to distinguish between a mandatory obligation to redeem and restrictions upon the sale of stock to
outsiders. Merely because a corporation imposes certain
restrictions upon the sale of its stock does not mean that
it has a mandatory obligation to redeem. 'Subparagraph 3
(b) specifically gives the employee the right to sell to an
outsider after having first given the Corporation an opportunity to redeem. This first option provision was not mentioned in the memorandum decision, thereby creating the
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impression that the employees had no option but to sell to
the Corporation and that the Corporation had a corresponding obligation to purchase under every set of circumstances.
G.

THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION PERMITS THE RESPONDENT TO PROFIT
FROM HIS OWN WRONG BY BREACHING
THE TERMS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
AGREEMENT.

If the Court's interpretation is sustained, it permits

this respondent to voluntarily resign and force the Corporation to purchase his stock at a premium, when in fact, as
a result of his breach of employment contract, the Oorporation is suffering substantial damage. On page 5 under
the mandatory repurchase provisions, the formula provides
for payment for good-will computed at two and one-half
times the yearly average profits during the previous five
years. The actual facts of this case are that Vulcan Steel
Corporation made money while Markosian was in its employ, since it permitted the Corporation to capitalize upon
the joint efforts of both Markosian and Gerstner. The Corporation now, without the benefit of this top echelon, management and ability, has in fact suffered financially and
will continue to suffer until a suitable replacement can
either be trained or hired from other sources, which is very
difficult. The profits of the Corporation have declined
since the resignation of Markosian. The respondent Markosian knows better than anyone else the problems he has
left the Corporation; yet his construction of the Agreement
would permit him to leave the Corporation voluntarily and
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then require the Corporation to pay him a premium for his
stock in the Corporation. The Agreement provides that the
respondent devote his entire time and efforts to the affairs
of the Corporation for a period of five years, which period
of time has not yet elapsed (R. 7 & 8). Respondent Markosian is therefore breaching this provision of the Agreement.
If the present interpretation of the Agreement is sus-

tained requiring a mandatory repurchase of Markosian's
stock at a premium, thus permitting the respondent to
profit from his own wrong, Gerstner hereby serves notice
that he may be required to inwke the provisions of subparagraph 3 ( e) requiring a liquidation and dissolution of
the Corporation and distribution to the parties of their
respe0tive interests. Such undesirable procedure would at
least permit both of the parties to be treated on the same
basis and receive such value as rightfully belongs to both
parties rather than permitting a wrongdoer to receive a
premium at the expense of the innocent remaining party.
Not only is the Corporation losing the benefit of Markosian's services in a crucial area, damaging the Corporation and causing loss of profits, but in addition, Markosian
is now a competitor of the Corporation and is soliciting
and procuring business from former customers and new
business which might have been available to the Corporation. Under such circumstances, it is unconsciona;ble for
the Court to make a strained interpretation of this Agreement, ignoring provisions of the contract, and reading into
the contract provisions not intended by the parties, thus
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permitting this respondent to profit by his own wrongful
conduct.
D.

SUBPARAGRAPH 3 (C) SHOULD BE
CONSTRUED AGAINST RESPONDENT
MARKOSIAN SINCE THIS PROVISION
WAS INITIALLY DRAFTED BY HIS ATTORNEY.

The Court, before ruling on these provisions of the
Agreement, should receive evidence which would show that
the respondent, as a minority stockholder, was concerned
about protecting himself and not having his investment
frozen into the Col"poration in the event the Corporation
terminated his employment. This is a matter over which
he would have no control; however, he does have control
over voluntarily resigning and different criterions would
therefore be involved in each instance. Because of this concern of Markosian, his attorney suggested and drafted the
provisions for the mandatory repurchase.
Q. Now I want to refer to the Agreement of
April 12th, 1which is marked "Markosian Exhibit
No. l" and refer to paragraph 3-c, Mandatory Obligation to Purchase Stock Offered on page 5 and
ask you if you would refer to that.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. Was that clause prepared by your attorneys for insertion in this agreement at your request?

A.

Yes, sir.
(Markosian Deposition p. 63, lines 18-25)
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Under such circumstances, any uncertainty should be
construed against respondent Markosian.
"When the terms of a written contract have been
chosen by one of the parties and merely assented to
by the other, this fact will in some cases affect the
interpretation that will be given to these terms by
the court. * * * If, however, it is clear that
the parties tried to make a valid contract, and the
remaining doubt as to the proper interpretation is
merely as to which of two possible and reasonable
meanings should be adopted, the court will adopt
the one which is the less favora:ble rin its 1egal effect
to the party who chose the words."
Corbin on Contracts, Section 559.
E.

IF THE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS
CONCERNING A MANDATORY REPURCHASE, THEN THE COURT SHOULD RECEIVE PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO THE
INTENT OF THE PARTIES BECAUSE:
1.

The Agreement was not intended as an integrated document; rather, it contemplated a
separate and additional employment contract
which would define the rights and duties arising from employment.

The rule against permitting parol evidence to aid in
the construction of a written document is predicated upon
the proposition that the written document is the final recitation of the intelllt of the parties and was intended to cover
all of the rights of the parties. Where it is clear, however ..
that the written document was not illltended to be the f1inal
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and complete embodiment of the intent of the parties, then
additional evidence is permissible. By the very terms of
the Agreement in question, it proviides that within 30 days
after the signing of the Agreement, a contract of employment would be entered inito by and between the Corporation and Markosian (R. 8). This contract of employment
was never consummated and, therefore, parol evidence
should be permitted to show the intent of the parties as it
pevtruined to the general subject of the employment of the
defendant.
2.

The divergent opinions of the parties would
at least indicate that the contract is uncertain
in this regard and requires amplifioation by
parol evidence.

All the foregoing arguments would indicrute that the
Court should rule as a matter of law that there is no mandatory repurchase requirement specified in the Agreement
where the respondent voluntarily resigns his employment
with the Corporation. These arguments, if not conclusive,
certainly have sufficient merit to indicate that the contract
is n1ot clear on this subject matter, but raJther is uncertain.
If there is uncertruinty or ambiguity or if the language is
susceptible of more than one meaning, then the Trial Court
should be permitted to receive evidence as to the true intent
of the parties and the Pre-Trial Judge should not rule as a
matter of law precluding such evidence. Ephraim Theatre
Cornpany v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221 ( 1958);
53 Am. Jur., Trial, Sec. 266 (1945) ..
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CONCLUSION
The Pre-Trial Court's interpretation requiring mandatory repurchase of stock, after the voluntary resignation
by fue respondent, disregards the language in the Agreement which contemplates that the termination would be by
the Corporation. Such interpretation ignores other sections
of the Agreement which specif1ically discuss the situation
in the event of voluntary resignations and the sale of stock
to outsiders; it permits the respondent to profit from his
own wrongdoing in breaching the terms of the five-year
employment clause. In addiition, any uncertainty in the
provisions of the contract on this issue should be construed
against the respondent, who insisted upon such provisions
and initially drafted them for insertion into the Agreement.
Further, the Pre-Trial Judge should not rule as a matter
of law precluding the Trial Court from considering the
evidence that the Agreement was not intended as an integmted document and precluding parol eviidence as ,to the
true intent of the parties since the Agreement, if not susceptible of the construction urged by the appellants, is then
ambiguous and requires further amplification. But most
of all, such construction should not be susta:ined to permirt
this respondent to .profit from his own wrongdoings at the
expense of the other parties ito the contract.
1

Respectfully submitted,
WILFORD A. BEESLEY and
LLOYD GERBER
15 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants
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